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Article text: 
 
China and other major developing countries will play an increasingly important role 
in global climate negotiations, writes Feng Cunwan. He suggest that, although 
China has recently adopted a number of measures to step up its approach to 
addressing climate change, the differences on policy and worldview between China 
and the EU are significant obstacles to their cooperation in Paris, and ultimately to 
reaching a meaningful deal. 
 
Since the end of the 20th century, international attention has focused on the issue 
of global warming, later adjusted to climate change. Despite more than 20 years of 
international negotiations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
the world has yet to implement a single and effective global arrangement that every 
country can agree on to contain greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
 
In 2009, the pledge from leaders to reach an agreement at the Copenhagen climate 
conference worthy of ‘the most important international summit since the Second 
World War’ ended with diplomatic zero. At Copenhagen, the EU and China had a 
number of high-profile disputes and the EU criticised China for not working 
together at such a critical point. In fact, China objected to almost every issue raised 
by the EU, insisting that, as a developing country, it could not commit to reducing 
GHG emissions beyond its capability. 
 
In the six years since the disappointment of Copenhagen, where China was seen by 
the West as largely impeding a binding agreement, Beijing has changed its climate 
policies at home and abroad. This time, China is bringing a raft of ambitious 
commitments to the negotiating table in Paris. Nevertheless, it remains unclear 
whether China will follow the track set by the EU and cooperate with it. 
 
Looking at China’s own climate policy may help us gauge that possibility. China has 
been the world’s largest GHG emitter since 2006. Under the 2009 Copenhagen 
Accord, Beijing pledged to reduce its emissions by 40-45 per cent from 2005 levels 
by 2020. China’s strong approach on the issue of GHG reduction is a reflection of 
politics in the national elite, but this does not mean that it will not take its 
international responsibilities and domestic demands into account. 
 
As its top climate negotiator, Xie Zhenhua, has stated, China’s economy and its 
constant pursuit of stability are important factors in the government’s plans. The 
argument runs that, with the largest population in the world and extensive 
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demands for employment, China should make economic growth and stability its 
primary and exclusive objectives. Radical proposals for big reductions in emissions 
would sabotage economic development. 
 
In fact, alongside its economic growth and its approach to climate change, China 
has increased its efforts in climate governance and begun to take significant steps 
to address this global issue. Examples from the recent national development plan 
can illustrate this shift. China’s twelfth five-year plan, covering 2011-2015, spelt 
out a number of reforms to domestic energy and climate policies. 
 
The headline targets were to reduce energy intensity by an additional 16 per cent, 
and carbon intensity by 17 percent, by 2015. In October 2011, China announced its 
intention to establish seven pilot carbon trading systems in five municipalities and 
two provinces across the country. In a joint announcement with the United States in 
November 2014, China set out two new goals: peaking greenhouse gas emissions by 
around 2030, and increasing non-fossil fuel sources to 20 per cent of total energy 
by 2030. 
 
China later included these two goals in its Intended Nationally Determined 
Contribution (INDC) to the new international climate agreement under negotiation 
in Paris, along with the aim of reducing carbon intensity by 60-65 per cent below 
2005 levels by 2030. 
 
On 25 September 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced a plan to launch a 
nationwide cap-and-trade program in 2017, covering power generation, iron and 
steel, chemicals, building materials including cement, paper-making and nonferrous 
metals. This comprehensive list serves a sign that China is taking bolder steps to 
address the climate issue, and these moves have been acknowledged by the EU as 
great progress. 
 
In particular, in a joint statement released several weeks before the Paris summit 
during François Hollande’s state visit to China, China and France declared that 
progress should be reviewed every five years in order to ‘reinforce mutual 
confidence and promote efficient implementation’. This was regarded by France as a 
positive step and good for momentum toward achieving a binding agreement at the 
climate change conference. 
 
Despite these steps by China, it remains uncertain whether it will cooperate fully 
with the EU in Paris. All these policies mentioned are rooted in China’s own national 
interest and reflect its willingness to act. In fact, most of the disputes from 
Copenhagen remain unresolved and they could still cause deadlock in the talks. 
 
A recent gathering held in China points to the centrality of developing countries to 
any deal. The day after a UN report highlighted the inadequacy of countries’ action 
plans on global warming, Brazil, South Africa, India and China (the so-called BASIC 
countries), urged rich nations to revise their emission targets to keep the rise in 
average global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius by 2100. 
 
They also called on developed countries, the EU and its Member States included, to 
‘honour their obligations to provide new, additional, predictable and adequate 
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financial resources to developing countries in a measurable, reportable and 
verifiable manner’. This confidence notwithstanding, it is unlikely that the EU will 
increase its funding and technology transfer enough to satisfy the need from 
developing countries. 
 
Overall, China’s recent efforts on climate change, however acceptable to and 
welcomed by the EU, are no guarantee that the EU and China can find common 
ground. China’s view of the world remains vastly different from the EU’s, a gap 
which the EU will likely find challenging to bridge. 
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